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John Grumleyl
The fact that so many of you are here today to celebrate this
centenary indicates that despite her death over thirty years ago
Hannah Arendt is alive and well, at least, in academic discourse.
There are many indices of this vitality. At a conference I attended
last year, the present Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the
New School, Agnes Heller, told me that she had already been
invited to three centenary events for this year; the ongoing
publication of fragments from Arendt's papers, the amazing
proliferation of secondary studies on just about all aspects of her
work in the last twenty years and frequent citations in a range of
contemporary journals, all demonstrate the robust good health of
Arendt's legacy. This is no small achievement for the emigre Jewess
who arrived in New York in 1940 without English, who at that time
had decided to distance herself from the whole academic business,
who consequently largely went her own way without fixed
institutional affiliation, who avoided the great ideological camps of
the Cold War, who found it difficult to locate herself on the political
spectrum and established no school to consecrate her memory.
Others have provided convincing cultural explanations of
Arendt's avid contemporary reception and I do not intend to add to
their analysis on this occasion.2 Today I want to turn to one of the
most mentioned, but least studied, concepts in her thought - that is
her concept of life. In Arendt's typology of human activities: action,
work, labour and the conditions to which they correspond:
plurality, worldliness and life, it is really the condition of life that
has received the least attention. This is not surprising. As far as
I I would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of my father Jack Crumley.
2 Heller, A. 'Why Hannah Arendt Now?'
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Arendt was concerned, in the modern productivist, consumerist
world everything associated with "Iife" had too high a priority. On
the other hand, action and work, which for her underwrote plurality
and worldliness, had become endangered species and she felt it was
her task to ring the alarm bells. To her way of thinking, the Western
tradition from the time of Plato had devalued politics and the
philosophical preference for contemplation and knowledge
(episteme) had usurped the classical Greek priority for action,
plurality and opinion. In this light, it was only understandable that
she directed most of her critical energies to the reanimation of
action, and the celebration of opinion and plurality in political
thought. The survival of individual action and plurality within a
humanly habitable world required that the domination of labour
and life be registered and resisted. With its implicit commitment to
equally bankrupt philosophies of history the Cold War seemed to
vindicate her judgement that modern politics was trapped in a
glacial impasse of ideologies. In this light, her critique of the society
of consumption, of the worship of jobholding and labour had a
freshness and relevance that still bites in the era of neo-Iiberalism.
My object today is not to overturn Arendt's legitimate political
priorities but only to shed some light on the assumptions that
underpin her understanding of the concept of life and to look briefly
at some alternative options.
1. Critique of the Philosophical Tradition
Despite her classical philosophical training with Heidegger and
Jaspers in the late twenties, Arendt embraced marginality. Her
critique of the tradition for its neglect of politics was so emphatic,
her diagnosis of the crisis of tradition so deep, her contempt for
contemporary Anglo-American philosophy so trenchant that for a
long time she preferred to be described as a "political theorist". At
that time it served her purposes to play the iconoclast. In an
interview for German television in 1964 with Gunter Gaus when he
describes her amongst "the circle philosophers", she replies: "I'm
afraid I have to protest. I do not belong to the circle of philosophers.
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My profession, if you can even speak of it at all, is political theory.3 I
neither feel like a philosopher, nor do I believe that I have been
accepted in the circle of philosophers ... " When Gaus pressed her by
saying: "I consider you to be a philosopher", Arendt replies: "Well I
can't help that, but in my opinion I am not. I have said good-bye to
philosophy once and for all".4 It matters little that Arendt latter
softened this self-imposed exile and was prepared to re-enter "the
circle of philosophers" nor that not all contemporary philosophers,
like Isaiah Berlin, might welcome her with open arms into that
circle, nor does it matter whether we judge this earlier reluctance to
be a strategic and contextual decision in the face of the then existing
philosophical climate or merely the expression of Arendt's personal
idiosyncrasy and theatricality. The more substantial point was that
she saw a deep historical tension between philosophy and politics
that went back to the founders of the Western tradition; philosophy
had built its empire in a defensive reaction against the dangers of
engulfment by politics. Arendt took it upon herself to expose this
tension and rehabilitate some of what she believed were the
essential realities of political life that had been ignored by the
tradition in its willingness to distance itself from the city and
politics. She never tired of reiterating this point because it is a
substantial part of her claim to originality in political philosophy.S
However, its relevance for the present paper lies only in the extent
to which it impinges on her analysis of the concept of life. It is my
contention that in this respect Arendt remained an exemplary
Platonian. When is came to understanding life, she is quite happy to
endorse Platonic dualism. Despite her otherwise emphatically anti-
Platonic imagination, she follows his path of ascension out of the
, Ira Katznelson, Desolation and Erlliglltenment (Columbia L"niversity Press, New York, 2003).
, "What Remains? The Language Remains: A Conversation with GUnler Gaus" in TI,e Portable
I latlllalr Arendt (Ed) Baehr, 1'. Penguin Books, New York, 2000, pp2-3.
5 On this point Richard Bernstein comments: 'From the 1930's on, Arendt returned over and
over again to the battle between philosophy and politics. She was acutely aware of the tendency
of philosophers and "pure thinkers" to turn away (and to denigrate) the confused contingency
of brute political realities. Unlike Heidegger, this is a danger to which she never succumbed:
'Provocation and Appropriation: Arendt's Response to Heidegge, in Confronting Mass
Democracy and Industrial Teclrnology (Ed) McCormick John P, Duke University Press, Durham,
2002, pp.295-318.
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darkness of family life and the cave;6 she associates the space of
political action with the light of the day, and this implicit
devaluation of mere life and its everyday reproduction which she
shares with the tradition introduces an awkward ambivalence into
her credentials as a true philosophical renegade.
2. The Hierarchy of Activities
It is well known that the framework for Arendt's reconstruction of
the activities of the human condition is derived from the ancient
lifeworld. Arendt returns to the hierarchical order of the vita activa
ignoring its philosophical reworking in favour of philosophical
contemplation. While contemplation was the province of a
philosophical elite, the other activities - labour, work and action -
are general human capacities that all humans participate in to
varying degrees. As part of her project to rehabilitate politics,
Arendt allegedly wanted to avoid the biases of the philosophical
founders and shared Heidegger's conviction that historical layers of
meaning had obscured the fundamental ontological insights
encoded in the original ancient languages. With this deliberately
incomplete framework Arendt hoped to see modern experience
through a critical lens informed by the whole tradition.
Her contention is that the activities of labour, work and action
constitute the human world. Each activity has an indispensable role
to play in human life while all are interdependent. Thus labour
sustains life, work builds the durable human artifice and action
gives form to individual identity. Yet without labour and the
reproduction of life neither work nor action would be possible,
while work and action provide a world and a meaning that makes
human life something different from the mere circularity of
biological process. Despite this interdependence, the distinctiveness
of each activity is at the heart of Arendt's diagnosis of modern ills.
She is at pains to stress that aims and standards of one specific
activity cannot be willy-nilly applied to the domain of another
'Ibid., p.6.
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without courting disaster. Thus the modern tendency to take the
standards and criteria of labour and apply them in the domains of
action and work might lead to an uninhabitable and characterless
world dominated by processuality and behaviour. Yet, while Arendt
wants to recognise the fundamental importance of each of these
activities, she also underlines that they are not equally human in
terms of value. She confirms the value hierarchy of the ancients by
ordering the activities in terms of the degree of freedom they entail
and the sense of a distinctive human reality they confirmed.? This is
why labour, so integral of the reproduction of life and its
requirements, is located at the bottom of the value hierarchy: it is
governed by necessity; work, which creates the distinctive and
durably human environment responds to needs but ones that are
not as urgent as biological compulsion; action is the most valuable
because in giving an individual stamp to achievement and creating
meaning it most expresses freedom. In all this, Arendt's critical
purpose is obvious. She goes on to argue that the value hierarchy
that has guided Western civilisation since at least the Greeks has
been rapidly overturned by modernity's re-evaluation of all values,
with consequences that can ultimately only be guessed but that
deserve more contemporary critical reflection.
What I have said so far is likely known to most of you at least in
broad outline. Now I want to concentrate my reconstruction on
Arendt analysis of the concept of life to see how this functions in her
programme for the reanimation of political theory.
3. The Concept of Life
In conventional English usage the concept of life has two distinct
meanings that are reproduced in Arendt's analysis. She
distinguishes between an individual life and organic nature as a
whole. The former, which she designates with the Aristotelian term
bios, is an appearance in the human world that designates an
7 Parekh, B. 'Hannah Arendt's Critique of Marx' lIallllah Arendt: n,e Recovery of tile Public World
(Ed) I'fill, M.A. Sl Marlins Press, New York, 1970, pp. 70-72.
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interval of time between life and death that follows a strictly linear
movement. The specifically human life is always full of events, can
be told as a biographical story and is "somehow a kind of praxis'.
The latter, zoe refers to organic nature in its eternal circularity that
knows neither birth nor death in this specifically human sense.8 On
the one hand, Arendt wants to emphasise that the former life,
inhabiting the humanly constructed artifice of the world and
characterised as it is by words and deeds, is, in its directionality and
rhythms, anti-natural, and more than mere organic life. Yet, at the
same time, she is only too aware that this is at least in part illusory.
Linear biography is also subject to the growth and decay of nature's
cyclical movement; the biological processes of bodily function have
an urgency and repetition that hems in the bios both from within
and without, and from which there is no escape except death.9 Thus,
the human metabolic exchange with nature is a moment within the
greater cosmic processes of natural organic circularity.
What human beings share with all other forms of life is the most
powerful drive that comes from life itself to transform the nature
around them into a form that allows them to subsist. This is why
Arendt says, "The human condition of labour is life itself".10 In a
deliberately paradoxical formulation she argues that the institution
of slavery in antiquity was not devised for cheap labour or as an
instrument of profit but as an attempt to exclude from the human
condition what humans share with all other forms of animal life.1l
That is to eliminate labour from the truly human condition.
Interestingly, while Arendt is typically wary of all modern
phantasies that "everything is possible", she views the Greek efforts
along these lines as an expression of the highest human nobility
whereas its consequences for the slaves passes without censure.
Life is only sustained by the two stage process of labour and
consumption where labour obtains from the superabundance of
nature the means which are constantly consumed and in need of
8 Arendt, H. 17,c Humall COllditioll, HB&j, New York, 1958, p.97.
9 Ibid., p.98.
10 Ibid, p.7.
11 Ibid., p.84.
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replenishment.12 This labouring activity of destructive
transformation, of gathering and mixing with the things of nature is
a form of devouring that foreshadows the bodies' process of
nourishment. The implacable repetition and circularity of this
process of mere subsistence signifies its futility. Not only does it
command us with irresistible necessity; it possesses no purpose
beyond the necessity from which it issues. It is precisely these
qualities of necessity and futility that, to Arendt's mind, mark
consumption and labour as the most inappropriate pinnacle of
modern priorities and preferences. Rather than a measure of the
achievement of our human nature, they seem to underscore human
imprisonment in an overarching natural processuality that
repudiates all distinction.
One of the strongest tendencies in Arendt's reconstruction of the
human condition is the distance she introduces between life and the
highest human attainments. Thus in a slight but significant
deviation from Aristotle, the words and deeds that characterise
human life are not viewed as the defining natural attributes of
human nature, but as those capacities by which humans are
definitively distinguished from nature. Another expression of this
distance is the confinement of life to the household and the domain
of privacy. Whereas for the Greeks the highest achievements of
action must have a public profile and be performed before an
audience of equals, life and its necessities are isolated within the
oikos. The appropriateness of this confinement is registered in
Arendt's discussion of the non-privative dimensions of privacy. A
life confined to the household is a deprivation because it would
exclude a Greek citizen from the highest things: the public realm of
freedom and association with his peers. Nevertheless, the necessity
that the citizen must avoid to partake of the highest activities has a
compulsion that cannot be denied. As we have already seen, an
unmatched urgency attends to the necessities of life. The abatement
of this urgency is one of the functions of the private sphere. Without
the property to satisfy daily needs, the public domain can be of no
12 Ibid., p.'l9.
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use. However, the functionality of household is not exhausted in
being the foundation of higher activity and achievement. Despite
her own celebrity, Arendt was a very private person who knew that
a life spent entirely in public becomes shallow.13 The life of
perpetual visibility lacks the quality "of rising into sight from some
darker ground which must remain hidden".14 Here Arendt seems to
suggest the intimate connection between freedom and necessity, a
homeostasis of human striving in which energies and strengths are
only nurtured beyond public attention.
Arendt assures us that the existence and importance of this non-
privative dimension of the household has always been known.ls The
distinction between private and public also expressed an ancient
demarcation between things that should be shown and those that
should be hidden. 16 Here again the category of life is the lynchpin
on which everything turns. Those things that were connected to the
bodily part of human existence, to the life process itself and the
survival of the species were hidden away. The labour, pain,
suffering, urgency, uniformity and futility connected with life were
best confined to the darkness. And even if the modern age no longer
believes that bodily functions and material concerns should be out
of sight, it is still the case that the few remnants of strict privacy still
evident in our civilization relate to their intimate connection to life
and the body,17
4. Life and History
We have already noted that one of the features of Arendt's
philosophical reconstruction of human activities is a desire for
historical perspective and an open-endedness that celebrates the
human capacity for creation and innovation. She wants to register
the crisis of the modern age and critically assess the rise of the social
n tbid.. p.71.
"Ibid.
" Ibid.
16 Ibid., p.n.
17 Ibid., p.73.
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and its resulting triumph of labour and consumption on a scale
wrought from the whole Western civilizatory achievement.
However, her realisation of this aim introduces a certain theoretical
tension into her treatment of the category of life. By its very
character the phenomenon of life seems to be almost beyond history.
In a very interesting short paper On the Human Condition for the first
Annual Conference on the Cybercultural Revolution in 196618
Arendt notes that, despite the industrial revolution, life and labour
remained much as they had always been. In certain ways both were
made easier, but they both still consumed at least the same amount
of time in the life of the individual.19 While the result of work and
labour changed dramatically, the cycle of living and labouring, of
periods of exhaustion and recovery changed hardly at all. Arendt
reminds us that we need to view the exceptionality of the Greek
achievement against the priority accorded to life cycle by the large
majority of mankind (sic):2o
The Greeks believed - and many amongst us believe -
that it is not enough to labor in order to live, and to
live in order to labor. But however highly we regard
the Greeks - and I regard them highly indeed - the
large majority of mankind has always lived in the
mere survival cycle which offered a certain
contentment and certain rewards from the bliss of
seeing one's children, and one's grandchildren, grow
to maturity. From the life cycle - the simple things -
most men have gained their rewards, in that they saw
their purpose.
Yet, all of this suddenly changed with the new challenges presented
by the contemporary world. Arendt now envisages the reversal of
the traditional social pyramid where the many would work for the
leisure of the few. The enormous potential opened up by
18Arendt, H. 'On the Human Condition' in n,e Evolving Society: First Annual Conference on the
Cybercultural Revolution-Cybernetics and Automation ICP Press, New York, 1966.
19 Ibid., p.215.
20 Ibid., p.216.
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technological advance, automation and cybernetics mandates not
only that now the few wiII work for the many, but that those of
higher social status wiII now toil as hard as slaves ever toiled in the
worst eras of history.21 The novel problem that seemed to be
emerging in the sixties with the dynamics of the modern social
world was the tragedy of vacant time for the masses. Here Arendt's
analysis turns on a distinction between leisure and idleness. The bios
theoretikos had taken for granted the desirability of leisure. Arendt
charged that the philosophical suspicion against politics was fuelled
by the fear that it would undermine or impinge on the time
allocated to the philosophical life. This leisure (sk/lOe) is understood
as "abstention from certain activities to be free for something else".22
Idleness, on the other hand, is both ugly and frightening. Its
ugliness lies in a potentially catastrophic breakdown in the life
rhythm of labouring and living, exhaustion and recovery so integral
to the cycle and tempo of life. It is frightening because the political
instability of the Roman Republic was associated with the idleness
of the plebs. In conditions of complete freedom, the aristocrats of the
past maintained a rigid code of discipline to ward off their
deterioration. The plebs, on the other hand, had no meaningful
activity to engage their energies and sought distraction and
satisfaction wherever they could find it. 23 One does not have to
endorse Arendt's reading of the decline of the Roman Republic to
accept that this analysis locates a serious problem that, while it has
assumed a different shape in the harsh climate of neo-Iiberalism, has
stiII not found a ready solution.
This problem has both moral and political dimensions. Deeply
rooted in our Christian culture is the link between maintenance and
labour that now seemed, from a technological standpoint,
historically obsolete.24 In closing, Arendt offers an alternative new
precept: "He who does not spend energy, shall not be able to sleep",
yet this seems more a physiological truism than a moral maxim. Her
"Ibid.• 'On the Human Condition'.
22 Ibid., p.217.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p.219.
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political solution to the problem of vacant time is no more
reassuring: the reorientation of the contemporary liberal democratic
life towards political activity on the model of the polis and the
replacement of vacant time with public service.25 This conclusion
sits oddly with her well-known view that political life is not for
everyone and that a more participatory democratic model would
foster a self-selecting political elite. This final flourish therefore
leaves the problem of vacant time for the great majority in mass
society unsolved.
However, this paper registers a gradual evolution in Arendt's
thinking in the post-war years in diagnosing the likely ills to flow
from the modern domination of the values of life and labour.
Beginning with totalitarianism, she moves from consumer society
and the society of jobholders, on to automation and the problem of
vacant time. But behind each of these appearances is a single
problem complex: the modern worldview that favours labour and
life. The intimate connection between life and necessity means that
the urgency manifest in life is not constrained by the apathy that in
the past inflicted wealthy societies. In the case of the democratic
liberal West, the "unnatural growth of the natural" has created
conditions of such abundance and technological achievement that
necessity itself seems to be disappearing. However, the result of this
is not the establishment of freedom but the "blurring of the
distinguishing line between freedom and necessity" where the latter
is mistaken for the former. 26 This blurring threatens not only the
initiative required by freedom but even the homeostasis of mass
human life, of exhaustion and recovery, of aspiration against
resistance.
Leaving aside the general adequacy of this diagnosis I want to
now focus on a fundamental tension in Arendt's approach. Her
preference for the framework of the human condition derived from
an explicit acknowledgement that human beings are always
conditioned but are not reducible to that conditioning and also
25/bid.
2. Arendl, H. Tile Human Cundition up. cit .• p.?!.
Literatllre & Aesthetics 16(2) December 2006, page 110
10/111 GrIIl1Iley: Hatlllah Arendt's Devaluatioll of Life?
capable of creativity and initiation. Yet, these insights make little
impression on the way she constructs her concept of life. Here she is
content to take over the classical understanding of labour as
drudgery and life.as the eternal circle of nature. While history does
impact on these categories, changing their evaluation and creating
new problems, the categories themselves seem almost beyond
history in their essential meaning. What makes this feature of her
thinking so perplexing is her already noted iconoclasm. On the one
side, she is only too willing to chastise the classical tradition for its
failure to come to grips with the essential ingredients of political life;
on the other, she obediently makes it's understanding of both life
and labour her own in adopting a sub specia aeternitas view of both
categories.
Whether or not this criticism bites really depends on the
possibility of an alternative understanding of these categories.
Marxist criticism of Arendt's distinction between labour and work
has already been argued extensively in the literature so I will not
review it here. However, as things are not so clear in regard to the
concept of life, I will explore it a little further. To demonstrate
alternative options I will look briefly at the concept of life in the
work of Michel Foucault and W. G. Sebald.
5. Life as Bio-politics
The place of the concept of life in Foucault's work is fairly well
known. He analyses it under the rubric "bio-power", which he
understands, along with disciplinary power, as the two key
ingredients of a new configuration of power that emerges in early
modernity. He was also prompted to dismiss the traditional
philosophical checklist of eternal questions and look more closely at
historical practices and their theoretical reflection. Accordingly, he
offers a radically historical account of this new power constellation
and the new political rationality designated: "reasons of state",27
27 Foucault, M. 'The Political Technology of Individuals' in Tec/Illoloilies of the Self A Semi"ar with
Michel Foucault (Ed) Martin, 1.., Gutman, H. & Hutton, 1'. University of Massachusetts Press,
Amherst, 1988.
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This latter orientation to political thinking leaves behind the old
questions of the "best state", or of the appropriate relation between
prince and people to focus on the nature of the newly emergent
modern state.28 This state is viewed as a consteIlation of forces, a
natural object, constituted from an irreducible multiplicity of
individuals, whose immanent strengths can be either advanced or
weakened by governments. Furthermore, this natural entity finds
itself in permanent competition with other states within the horizon
of a limited history.29
From this perspective, the task of politics is no longer confined to
questions of law but must turn its attention to new questions of a
specificaIly modern order: all the behaviour of the individual - what
they do, their life, death, work and individual morality - is relevant
insofar as it impacts on the strength of the state.30 Even their
happiness is not an end but as an instrument towards strengthening
the state. The new political rationality has a technique fitting for this
task: the police. While its task - ensuring public health, food,
housing, production, fair markets and general co-existence -
appears mainly administrative, the new doctrine interprets it
positively as concerned with the active and productive aspects of
life. This makes sense because its object is very comprehensive - the
indispensable, the useful and the superfluous - ultimately life
itself.31 Everything that fosters the lives of the citizens and the
strength of the state falls into its province. In a striking formulation,
Foucault teIls us that the new rationality wields its power"over
living beings, as living beings and its politics therefore, has to be a
bio-politics" .32
There can be no question as to Arendt's awareness of the facts
that constitute the substance of Foucault's reconstruction of bio-
politics. It is symptomatic that the statistics, which he views as the
2" Ibid .• p.1S0.
29 Ibid., p.1S2.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p.1S?
"Ibid., p.160.
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political arithmetic of this new rationality,33 are, for Arendt, the
currency of the new behavioural sciences that exemplify the
disappearance of action and the authentically political from the
modern world. The difference between these two perspectives is
that Foucault is not content to leave the category of life as the index
of the ultimate futility of human life and merely the necessary
condition of politics, which it then leaves to the realm of eternal
darkness. Although equally critical of many of the developments
associated with the new political rationality, he sees that in this new
constellation the meaning of the category of life has been radically
inflected in a way that delivered it an entirely new semantic range.
In the new lexicon of politics the category of life has a
fundamentally new meaning, which associates it inextricably with
productivity and politics. Foucault's assault on the political tradition
involves a radical historicisation of a whole constellation of
categories and questions. Careful investigation of historical sources
reveals a rupture that infuses the concepts of power, revolution and
life with a new content and potential unacknowledged by the
tradition.
On this reading, Arendt's interpretation of life seems too
indebted to traditional philosophical dualism. Her distinction
between individual life and organic nature as a whole reproduces
the Platonism that she otherwise rejects. She views organic nature as
the inescapable condition of individual life but this remains a
merely cyclical and ultimately futile foundation were it not for the
added value that derives from another ontological order: the
narrative bios rich in events, actions and meaning. Here Arendt
reveals her emphatic humanist credentials:34
I am very much inclined to say that human beings -
conditioned beings as they are by definition - can
indeed adjust voluntarily and speedily. Man (sic) is
not merely conditioned by his environment; he
conditions the environment, and the environment then
33/bid.• p.1S!.
34 Arendt, A. 'On the 1·luman Condition' op. cit., p.2l8.
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conditions him in turn ... Man has always adjusted to
new conditions more speedily than he thinks himself
capable of doing.
6. Creaturely Life in the Prism of Natural History
At this juncture 1 want to introduce another concept of life
associated with the German novelist W. G. (Max) Sebald. This
conception of life has been called "creaturely life" by Eric Santner
who associates it with a predominately Jewish tradition that goes
back to Rosenzweig, Benjamin and Adorno.35 He explains that this
understanding of life refers to the peculiar proximity of the human
to the animal at the point of their radical difference. Especially at the
point where the normal run of social and political life is exposed to
traumatic transformation and violence under conditions of
modernity, a new dimension of creaturely human existence is called
into being. Here the dual possibilities of life as normative structure
and suffering, natural organism and mute relic co-exist. Sebald
relies explicitly on the idea of natural history associated with
Benjamin. Natural history has to do with the breakdown and
reification of meaning in human life. It entails not only that nature
has a history but more that the artefacts of human history acquire
the characteristics of natural being at the juncture where they begin
to lose their place in a viable form of life.36 But the inherent duality
involved in these traumatic crises and repetitious cycles of
emergence and decay mean that the demise of a human "second
nature" can also be experienced as a denaturisation, transformation
into a mere ruin of historical being.J7 For Santner, the creaturely
dimension of human beings refers not simply to the fact that we are
just one creature amongst others, or that we share with them animal
suffering but that we are more creaturely in virtue of an excess
35 Sanlner, Eric. J. On Creature1y Life University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006, p. 12.
3. Ibid., p.16.
" Ibid., p.17.
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produced in the space of the political that, paradoxically, accounts
for our humanity.38
Amongst the many employments of these ideas in the novels
and essays of W G Sebald, one instance is his Zurich lectures later
published as On the Natural History of Destruction.39 These lectures
address the issue of the saturation air raids over Germany towards
the end of the Second World War and, specifically, the surprising
reluctance of German post-war literature to give expression to the
widespread social devastation and trauma involved. However,
Sebald's interest in this episode goes far beyond the obvious
strategic and moral questions raised by total war. For him, what is
involved here is a question of an entire culturallogic:4o
So much intelligence, capital and labour went into the
planning of such destruction that under the pressure
of all the accumulated potential, it had to happen in
the end.
And this realisation requires a fundamental change of perspective:
"the autonomy of mankind in the face of the real or potential
destruction that it has caused is no greater in the history of the
species than the autonomy of the animal in the scientist's cage" .41 At
the point where culture has turned into rubble amidst the ruins of
the German cities, Sebald finds the signature of a collective
catastrophe where history threatens to revert to natural history.42
Behind the immediate catastrophic episode is a putative deeper
malaise at the level of human anthropogenesis that he supposes
may just be an "evolutionary mistake". He explicitly evokes
Benjamin's angel ofhistory whose face is turned not to the future but
to the past and who, where we perceive a chain of events, "sees one
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage"
while the storm we call "progress" is caught in his wings propelling
3R Ibid., p. 26.
39 Sehald. w.e. 01/ tire Natural t /istory of Des/ruction Ilamish Hamilton, London, 2003.
40 Sebald, w.e. Cam!,o Sal/to I famish Ilamilton, London, 2005, p.97.
41 Ibid., p.9S.
42 Ibid., p.8S.
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him blindly backwards.43 The wide-eyed stare and open mouth of
this angel is likely an effort to bear witness to this cumulative
creaturely suffering.
Another key motif of the natural history perspective in an image
taken over via Kluge from Marx: the history of industry being the
open book of human thought and feelings. 44 In an ironic twist to the
materialist thesis that production as revealed in industry is the
essence of man (sic) and the engine room of his autonomous history,
it is retorted that the overwhelming destruction of the air raids is a
"kind of experiment" anticipating the point where we "shall drop
out of what we have thought so long to be our autonomous history
and back into the history of nature" .45 Yet, it still remains true that
the enormous suffering entailed has been absorbed into the lived
space, and lies deposited and manifest in the ash, dusts and ruins of
the perpetrating social objectivity.
Sebald attributes the failure of the initial post-war writers to
capture this traumatic experience to the "internal emigrants'
reliance on vague notions of freedom and the humanist inheritance
of the West in endless and prolix abstractions" .46 The elements of a
more aesthetically compelling and morally trenchant approach
appeared only later in the work of Kluge who adopts an indirect
method of research into the past. The rapidity of the destruction and
its overwhelming scale defied immediate comprehension: learning
was only really possible retrospectively, from subsequent reportsY
The demand for the more detached standpoint of natural history
was bolstered by its avoidance of the compromises and illusions still
clinging to humanist narrative. The natural scientific observer
maintains an essential distance: Kluge notices that despite the
obliteration and silence of the ruins, fires are still burning in the
cellars and"after a few days paths bearing some relation to the old
road network are trodden over", the "activity of many crawling
'3 Sebald. W.e. 011 ti,e Natura/History of Destructioll "I'. cit., p.68.
" Ibid., p.67.
"/bid.
'·Scbald, W.G. On tlte Natura/History of Destruction 01'. cit., p. 9.
"Scbald, W.G. Caml' Sail to 01'. cit., p.90.
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creatures" .48 A vantage point above the destruction suggests the
inevitable return of the disastrous old ways and behaviour. But
Sebald leaves us guessing whether we are witnessing just another
episode in the cycle of organic life or another recidivist calamity in
the history of human autonomy. There can be little doubt that he
views the tension derived from the simultaneous switch between
the perspectives of history and nature as the most effective aesthetic
realisation and moral register of the uniqueness of this concrete
event. He employs such switch images throughout his work to
capture the more profound mystery of life. One need only recall the
image of the North Sea gradually reclaiming the 19th century
industry and towns of the coastal regions of East Anglia as they
slowly subside into the mud to rejoin nature in The Rings of Saturn.49
We can only guess that to his mind even Arendt's constrained
humanism, which has dispatched the megalomaniac dreams of the
Nazis and underscored the conditionality of human life in the web
of relations both social and natural, is not sufficiently free of
illusions and complicity to serve contemporary critical purposes.
Sebald's own melancholic acts of testimony and memory are not
politics but a literary project of community where chance
encounters with the creaturely dimension of the neighbour propel
the dynamic of knowledge and the possibility of moral resistance to
such misfortune.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to bring a critical focus to the relatively
neglected concept of life in Arendt's work. However, before
summarising my predominantly critical conclusions I want to echo
Arendt's own preface to her own critical remarks on Marx in The
Human Condition with its homage both to his greatness and the rich
bounty he had provided for others.
4R Ibid.
'0 St>bald. W.G. TI"'/<ilJi/s afSatum New Directions. New York. 1998.
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We have already seen that her severe repudiation of the classical
tradition in political thought did not stop her endorsing the ancient
devaluation of mere life. If anything, her rendering of the distinction
between bios and zoe is even sharper than that found in Aristotle
insofar as she defines the human achievement in opposition to the
life of nature, which is characterised primarily by its futility. I am
not the first to raise critical objections to Arendt's conceptual
distinctions and her desire to cast them as sure and immovable
markers of profound political truths. Those familiar with the
literature would be well aware of the critique of her distinction
between the social and the political. Many feel that it fails to capture
the essential fluidity that reigns in the migration of issues and topics
between the social and the political. It seems to me that Arendt's
interpretation of life suffers from a similar deficiency. Her reading
of the concept of life is almost beyond history. And while few would
argue that biological life seems relatively immune from the
vicissitudes so common to the domain of human action, it still
cannot be completely divorced from it. The introduction of the
alternative understandings of the concept of life in the work of
Foucault and Sebald was intended to illustrate this point. Foucault
interprets the concept of life like any other, demonstrating how the
profound changes that gave rise to what he called the disciplinary
society also impacted on both our understanding and evaluation of
life. In the framework of bio-politics, life could not remain solely in
the domain of the private under the designation of futility but had
to be accorded a public profile and a higher priority in explicitly
political thinking. While Foucault demonstrates the possibility of
inflecting the concept of life from the perspective of history, Sebald
cautions against excessive historicisation of life. The natural history
perspective provides a cautionary detachment from the illusions of
human autonomy and the potential to capture the particular and
concrete in its multiple shades and signification. The concept of life
that emerges from Sebald's elegiac prose is not the mere
processuality and futility that exhausts Arendt's reflective humanist
reading of it but something more mysterious, more creaturely in
both senses of this word. Her iconoclastic critique of the Western
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tradition should not deceive us: Arendt is still the bearer of a post-
Second World War western cultural confidence that in Sebald,
writing at the end of the 20th century, has reached its nadir. If we
needed more evidence that a new spirit surrounds the question of
life we need not look further than Giorgio Agamben's recent
injunction in The Open (2004) that it "is more urgent to work on the
divisions, to ask in what way - within man (sic) - has man
separated from non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is
to take positions on the great issues, on so-called human rights and
values"so. Whether he is right or whether the choice need be put in
these stark terms I shall leave for another time, but his position does
reinforce our sense of distance from Arendt.
This is in no way meant to imply that she now has little to say to
a contemporary audience. My opening remarks implied Arendt's
reputation is in the ascendant and this is not without good reason.
Her interest in human creativity, action, freedom, contingency,
fallibility, marginality and her disavowal of historical laws, mere
behaviour and processuality remains timely. But even more than
this, at the heart of her philosophy was an insistence that life was
the only thing worthy of philosophical scrutiny. This life is the
common human life where nothing comes to an end, where
everything is chaotic and where each new individual and generation
gets to start all over again. 51 This capacity for renewal that Arendt
identified as natality implies the readiness to submit our cultural
inheritance to critique. In this spirit it is only fitting that in the
centenary of her birth we celebrate her theoretical fecundity by
seeking her assistance to "think what we are doing".
50 Agamben, G. Tile Open: Mall Alld AI/inlt/l Stanford IJniversity Press, Stanford California, 2004.
1'16.
51 Heller, A. ap. cit., P 24.
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